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In this paper, we quantify the changes in the relationship between international forces and many key
US macroeconomic variables over the 1984-2005 period, and analyze changes in the monetary policy
transmission mechanism. We do so by estimating a Factor-Augmented VAR on a large set of US and
international data series. We find that the role of international factors in explaining US variables has
been changing over the 1984-2005 period. However, while some US series have become more correlated
with global factors, there is little evidence suggesting that these factors have become systematically
more important. We don't find strong evidence of a change in the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy due to global forces. Taking our point estimates literally, global forces do not seem to have
played an important role in the US monetary transmission mechanism between 1984 and 1999. In
addition, since the year 2000, the initial response of the US economy following a monetary policy
shock --- the first 6 to 8 quarters --- is essentially the same as the one that has been observed in the
1984-1999 period. However, point estimates suggest that the growing importance of global forces
might have contributed to reducing some of the persistence in the responses, two or more years after
the shocks. Overall, we conclude that if global forces have had an effect on the monetary transmission
mechanism, this is a recent phenomenon.
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In many respects, the economic integration of the U.S. economy with the rest of the world has
deepened in the last two decades. International trade has continued to expand more rapidly than
economic activity in industrialized countries. For the US, the amount of goods and services imported
and exported which represented 18% of GDP in the mid-1980’s represents more than 27% in 2005.
But the globalization of ﬁnance has shown a much more dramatic development. During the same
period, the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP has increased from approximately 80%
to more than 300% in the 23 most industrialized economies, according to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2006). As global economic integration is spreading, it is often argued that macroeconomic variables
in one country – whether they pertain to measures of economic activity, inﬂation, or interest rates
– should increasingly reﬂect events occurring in the rest of the world.1
Such developments raise naturally two sets of questions which we attempt to address in this
paper. First, to what extent have international factors aﬀected the determination of key macroeco-
nomic variables in the US economy? Is it the case that with the recent globalization, this economy
has become more strongly aﬀected by international factors? Second, has the very rapid globaliza-
tion of ﬁn a n c ew e a k e n e dt h ea b i l i t yo fU Sm o n e t a r yp o l i c yt oi n ﬂuence domestic ﬁnancial market
conditions, and through it, the rest of the economy? In other words, does a change in the Federal
Funds rate have a smaller impact on the US economy now than it used to?
Central bankers and economists in the ﬁnancial press have pointed out the fact that while the
US central bank raised the Federal funds rate target by 425 basis points between June 2004 and
July 2006, long-term rates remained at historically low levels with the ten-year Treasury bond yield
increasing by less than 40 basis points and the twenty-year yield actually falling by 20 basis points
during that time. This phenomenon, which former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
labeled “conundrum” highlights the fact that US long-term interest rates may have become more
dependent on international factors than had been observed historically. As then Governor Bernanke
1For example, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Richard Fisher, and Michael Cox (2007) have
argued that domestic inﬂation may be increasingly determined in the rest of the world. Advocating a “new inﬂation
equation,” they conclude that “globalization has been changing how we consume as well as the way we do business.
It’s high time economic doctrine caught up.” The Economist (2005), citing Stephen Roach, chief economist of Morgan
Stanley, and the 2005 annual report of the Bank for International Settlements suggests that global forces have become
more important relative to domestic factors in determining inﬂa t i o ni ni n d i v i d u a lc o u n t r i e s .
1(2005) explained, a more extensive global ﬁnancial integration and the increased amount of savings
outside the US – in particular in developing economies – may have resulted in a “global saving
glut” which may have put downward pressures on long-term interest rates. A casual look at such
recent historical episodes raises the possibility that the long-term yields may respond less to changes
in Federal funds rates than in the past. Given that monetary policy does at least in part aﬀect
the economy through its eﬀect on long-term rates, it is natural to wonder about the implications
of the globalization of ﬁnance for the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. Certainly, the answers to
such questions have key implications for a proper understanding of the determinants of economic
ﬂuctuations, and for policy.
To address these questions, we provide in this paper an empirical assessment of the synchro-
nization between international factors and key US economic variables. We then investigate whether
the importance of these global forces has changed for the US economy over the last two decades,
and how such a possible change has aﬀected the transmission of monetary policy.
The general empirical framework that we consider is a factor-augmented vector autoregression
model (FAVAR), as described in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005), but extended to explicitly
include international or “global” factors. One of its key features is to provide estimates of macro-
economic factors that aﬀect the data of interest by systematically exploiting all information from
a large set of economic indicators. In our application, we estimate the empirical model based on
the information from a large number of macroeconomic indicators, and disaggregated data for the
US, as well as a large set of macroeconomic indicators for the 15 major US trade partners. By
identifying US monetary policy shocks, this framework allows us to uncover the transmission of
such shocks to a large set of macroeconomic indicators. Our interest in studying the responses
to monetary policy shocks does not reside in the fact that these shocks are important. In fact,
it is well-known that they contribute only little to US output ﬂuctuations. Rather, we ﬁnd the
responses to such shocks interesting as they allow us to trace out the eﬀects of monetary policy on
the economy.
Many studies have provided evidence that key macroeconomic variables display substantial
comovements across countries. For instance, Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003), analyzing output,
consumption and investment data from 60 countries over the 1960-1990 period, document that a
2large fraction of business cycles ﬂuctuations of developed economies is accounted by a common
world factor. The latter factor – a component of economic activity which is common to all
countries considered – explains more than one third of output ﬂuctuations in the US and in
Europe.2 Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) argue that inﬂation in industrialized economies is also largely
a global phenomenon: they ﬁnd that on average, about 70% of inﬂation variance is attributable
to a common global factor given by the component of inﬂation that is common across countries.
Moreover, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon (2005) show that shocks to money, bond and equity
markets result in substantial spillovers between the US and Europe.
Other researchers have recently examined whether the importance of such comovements across
regions has changed over time. The evidence regarding the output synchronization is mixed. Kose,
Prasad and Terrones (2003) report evidence of stronger comovements of output in industrialized
countries with a world factor, since the early 1980’s, than in the preceding two decades. However,
Doyle and Faust (2005), testing for changes in comovements among real activity measures for
the G7 countries ﬁnd very few statistically signiﬁcant changes over the 1960-2000 period. When
looking at their point estimates, they even ﬁnd some evidence of a fall in the correlation across
countries since the early 1980s. Such a reduced synchronization is in fact consistent with ﬁndings
of Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), Monfort, Renne, Ruﬀer and Vitale (2003), Heathcote and Perri
(2004), Stock and Watson (2005), and Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2005). According to Stock
and Watson (2005), and Kose et al. (2005), the fact that the output correlations across countries
were particularly high in the 1970s may reﬂect unusually strong common shocks, such as large
movements in oil prices, during that period. These authors thus argue that the reduction in the
2Similar comovements in economic activity have been documented for more restricted sets of countries. Gerlach
(1988) found that industrial production is positively correlated across several OECD countries. Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1995) and Baxter (1995) found that business cycles share similarities in major industrial economies.
Gregory, Head and Raynauld (1997) in an early estimation of a factor model on economic activity data for the G7
countries, detected a signiﬁcant common factor across countries. Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998), analyzing more
than one hundred years of data, found that the synchronization in activity across 13 industrialized countries remains
strong regardless of the monetary regime. Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2000), proposing a generalized dynamic
factor model and applying it to data of 10 European economies, ﬁnd that a common European activity factor explains
between 35% and 96% of the volatility in countries’ GDP. Clark and Shin (2000), similarly ﬁnd that a common factor
accounts substantial variations in industrial production of European economies, and Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003),
examining correlations between industrial output in 17 OECD countries and a common component, ﬁnd evidence of
a world business cycle and of a European business cycle. Canova, Ciccarelli and Ortega (2004), estimating a Bayesian
panel VAR model on G7 data ﬁnd also a signiﬁcant world business cycle, but ﬁnd no evidence of a cycle speciﬁct o
the Euro area, in contrast to some of the other studies.
3volatility of common international shocks since in the early 1980s, compared to the 1960s and 1970s,
provides an important explanation for the reduced synchronization among G7 countries since the
early 1980s, and that the correlation in output across countries would have been larger, had the
international common shocks been as important in the 1980s and the 1990s, as they were in the
1960s and 1970s.
In addition, some authors have argued that the development of trade in goods and services,
especially with low-cost producing economies such as China and India may have altered the rela-
tionship between some measure of the output gap and domestic inﬂation (see, e.g., Rogoﬀ (2004),
Borio and Filardo (2006), Ihrig et al. (2007)).
While we also seek to characterize changes US macroeconomic dynamics due to global forces,
our paper distinguishes itself from the papers just mentioned in several respects.
First, in general, global co-movements among macro variables could arise from the presence of
exogenous global – or worldwide – shocks, or from the international transmission of domestic
shocks. Our central focus in this paper is the implications for monetary policy of the changes in
the role of global forces. It is thus important to stress that while we allow for the presence of global
shocks like in many of the papers just cited, our interest will be mainly on the characterization of
the international transmission of regional shocks. In particular, we determine to what extent the
transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks – as measured by exogenous changes in the Federal
funds rate – to key US economic variables such as long-term interest rates, output, inﬂation, and
so on, has been altered by global forces.
Second, in order to identify the monetary transmission mechanism, we jointly model multiple
dimensions of the US economy. Thus, rather than restricting ourself to the comparison of a single
type of measures across regions of the world – e.g. only economic activity measures or only inﬂation
measures – we adopt a more general and encompassing approach which allows us to compare a set
of factors summarizing the US macroeconomic dynamics with those summarizing the rest of the
world’s macroeconomic dynamics. Another contribution is hence to consider a much broader set
of macroeconomic indicators than has been used before in order to document the changes in the
importance of global forces for the determination of US measures of real activity, inﬂation, interest
rates and various other series.
4Finally, we focus on the evolution since 1984. Our sample includes the period during which
the globalization of ﬁnancial ﬂows accelerated signiﬁcantly and allows us to sidestep an important
issue: the considerable changes that occurred in the preceding decade. The period of large common
shocks, in the 1970s and the early 1980s, during which the business cycles of many countries were
strongly correlated, was followed in the US by a rapid adjustment – called “great moderation” –
to a regime characterized by lower output volatility.3 Some studies have explained the reduction
in volatility with a reduced volatility of shocks (e.g., Stock and Watson (2002a), Sims and Zha
(2006), Justiniano and Primiceri (2006), Smets and Wouters (2007)). In addition, as documented
in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), Boivin (2006), Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), Boivin and
Giannoni (2002, 2006a), the systematic response of US monetary policy to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation
and output has changed signiﬁcantly around 1980, revealing a greater tendency to stabilize inﬂation
ﬂuctuations. As Boivin and Giannoni (2006a) emphasize, such a change in policy can explain in
large part why the responses of output and inﬂation to an unexpected change in the Federal funds
rate of a given size have been much smaller since the early 1980s, than they were in the 1960s
and 1970s. By considering the period after 1984, i.e., a period during which both the variance of
the shocks may reasonably be assumed to have remained constant and the systematic monetary
policy rule has not been found to have dramatically changed, we hope to better isolate the eﬀect
of international factors.
It is important to stress, however, that our sample is relatively short: it contains a bit more
than 20 years of quarterly data. We expect a priori that this will make statistical relationships
harder to detect and will constitute an important constraint on the richness of the models that we
can contemplate in the empirical exercise below. This is an important sense in which we see our
analysis as an exploration of how important global forces might have become for the US economy.
But as the results seem to suggest, there is still suﬃcient statistical information in the sample that
allows us to learn something useful about changes in the economy in the recent past.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that common factors capture on
3Many researchers have documented a sharp drop in the volatility of the US real GDP in the early 1980s (see,
e.g., McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2002), Stock and
Watson (2002a)). Stock and Watson (2005) show that other G7 countries with the exception of France have similarly
experienced lower output volatility since the mid-1980s compared to the previous decades.
5average a sizable fraction of the ﬂuctuations in US macroeconomic indicators. This provides support
for the use of our empirical model. Second, there is evidence that the role of international factors
in explaining US variables has been changing over the 1984-2005 period, but this evolution is
not systematic across series, and it is diﬃcult to see a pattern suggesting that they have become
generally more important. Some variables such as the long-term interest rates, as well as import
and export prices, however, do display a systematic increase of their correlation with global factors
throughout our sample.
We don’t ﬁnd strong statistical evidence of a signiﬁcant change in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy due to global forces. Taking our point estimates literally, global forces do not
seem to have played an important role in the US monetary transmission mechanism between 1984
and 1999. Also, since 2000, the initial response of the US economy following a monetary policy
shock – the ﬁrst 6 to 8 quarters – is essentially that same as the one that has been observed
in the 1984-1999 period. However, point estimates suggest that the growing importance of global
forces might have contributed to reducing some of the persistence in the responses, two or more
years after the shocks.
Overall, we conclude that if global forces have had an eﬀect on the monetary transmission
mechanism, this is a recent phenomenon. This means however that we will need more data before
we can get strong statistical conclusions on this question.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the econometric frame-
work adopted and the estimation approach. In Section 3, we present empirical results on the
comovements between international factors and US data, and document changes in these relation-
ships over the last two decades. In Section 4, we document to what extent the role of global factors
has changed the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Section 5 concludes.
2E c o n o m e t r i c F r a m e w o r k : F A V A R
One key objective of this study is to evaluate the importance of the rest of the world in the
transmission of US monetary policy. That is, we seek to estimate to what extent the response of
the rest of the world’s economy enhances or mitigates the eﬀect of US monetary policy on the US
6economy, and, importantly, whether this has changed over time. The FAVAR model described in
Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) (BBE) provides a natural framework to address these questions.
In this section, we describe the empirical model and our estimation approach.
2.1 Description of FAVAR
The econometric framework that we consider is based on the FAVAR extended to include interna-
tional factors. We consider two regions: the US economy and the rest of the world, which we denote
with *. We assume that in each region, the state of the economy, which is possibly unobserved, can
be summarized by a K×1 vector Ct in the US, and a K∗×1 vector C∗
t for the rest of the world. We
measure the state of the economy in each region with large vectors of macroeconomic indicators,
denoted by Xt for the US, and X∗
t for the rest of the world. These vectors are of dimension N ×1
and N∗ × 1 respectively. The indicators are assumed to relate to the state of the economy in each
region according to the observation equations





where Λ and Λ∗ are matrices of factor loadings of appropriate dimensions, and the N×1 (respectively
N∗×1) vectors et and e∗
t contain (mean-zero) series-speciﬁc components that are uncorrelated with
the common components Ct (respectively C∗
t ), but are allowed to be serially correlated and weakly
correlated across indicators. The number of common factors is assumed to be small relative to the
number of indicators, i.e., N>Kand N∗ >K ∗.
Under this structure, Ct and C∗
t constitute two sets of components which are common to all data
series in the respective region and in general correlated across regions. Equations (1)—(2) reﬂect
the fact that the common factors represent pervasive forces that drive the common dynamics of
the data, and summarize at each date the state of the economy in each region. The variables in Xt
are thus noisy measures of the underlying unobserved factors Ct. Note that it is in principle not
restrictive to assume that Xt depends only on the current values of the factors, as Ct can always
7capture arbitrary lags of some fundamental factors.4 The unobserved factors should reﬂect general
region-speciﬁc economic conditions such as “economic activity,” the “general level of prices,” the
level of “productivity,” and key dimensions of the interest-rate term structure, which may not easily
be captured by a few time series, but rather by a wide range of economic variables.





























where Φ0 is a matrix of appropriate size on which we will later impose some restrictions, Φ(L) is
a conformable lag polynomial of ﬁnite order, and the “structural” shocks vt and v∗
t are assumed
to be iid with mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix Q and Q∗ respectively. While these
shocks are uncorrelated, anyone of these shocks may aﬀect common factors of the other region
immediately or over time, through the oﬀ-diagonal elements of Φ0 and Φ(L). This structural VAR
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where the reduced-form innovations ut and u∗
t are cross-correlated.
Since we will ultimately be interested in characterizing the eﬀects of monetary policy on the
economy, we include in the vector of US common components an observable measure of the mon-
etary policy stance. As in most related VAR applications, we assume that the Federal funds rate,
Rt, is the policy instrument. The latter will be allowed to have pervasive eﬀect throughout the










where Ft is a vector of latent macroeconomic factors summarizing the behavior of the US economy.
4This is why Stock and Watson (1999) refer to (1) as a dynamic factor model.
82.2 Interpreting the FAVAR structure in an international context
The empirical model we just laid out is a dynamic factor model that links a large set of observable
indicators to a small set of common components through the observation equations (1)—(2). The
evolution of these common components is speciﬁed by the transition equation (3) or its reduced-
form representation (4). It is useful to spell out more clearly the economic interpretation of this
empirical model and, in particular, the relationship with possible underlying structural models.
As in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) and in Boivin and Giannoni (2006b), we interpret
the unobserved factors, Ct and C∗
t as corresponding to theoretical concepts or variables that would
enter a structural macroeconomic model. For instance, open-economy dynamic general equilibrium
models such as those of Benigno and Benigno (2001), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002), Lubik and
Schorfheide (2005), and those of many papers collected in Galí and Gertler (2007) fully characterize
the equilibrium evolution of inﬂation, output, interest rates, net exports and other variables in two
regions. In terms of the notation in our empirical framework, all of these variables would be in Ct
and C∗
t . The dynamic evolution of these variables implied by such open-economy models can be
approximated by an unrestricted VAR of the form (4).5 If all of these macroeconomic concepts were
perfectly observed, the system (4) would boil down to a standard multi-country VAR and could
be estimated directly, as in, e.g., Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Grilli and Roubini (1995,1996),
Cushman and Zha (1997), Kim and Roubini (2000), Scholl and Uhlig (2006). In such a case, there
would be no need to use the large set of indicators Xt.
However, there are reasons to believe that not all relevant concepts are perfectly observed. First,
some macroeconomic concepts are simply measured with error.6 Second, some of the macroeco-
nomic variables which are key for the model’s dynamics may be fundamentally latent. For instance,
the concept of “potential output” often critical in monetary model cannot be measured directly. By
using a large data set, one is able to extract empirically the components that are most important
in explaining ﬂuctuations in the entire data set. While each common component does not need to
represent any single economic concept, the common components Ct and C∗
t should constitute a
5For a formal description of the link between the solution of a DSGE model in state-space form and a VAR see,
e.g., Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez, Sargent and Watson (2007) and references therein.
6Boivin and Giannoni (2006b) argue, for example, that inﬂation is imperfectly measured by any single indicator,
and that it is important to use multiple indicators of it for proper inference.
9linear combination of all of the relevant latent variables driving the set of noisy indicators Xt and
X∗
t , to the extent that we extract the correct number of common components from the data set.
An advantage of this empirical framework is that it provides, both for the US and the inter-
national data sets, summary measures of the state of these economies at each date, in the form
of factors which may summarize many features of the economy. We thus do not restrict ourselves
simply to measures of inﬂation or output. Another advantage of our approach, as BBE argue,
is that this framework should lead to a better identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock than
standard VARs, because it explicitly recognizes the large information set that the Federal Reserve
and ﬁnancial market participants exploit in practice, and also because, as just argued, it does not
require to take a stand on the appropriate measures of prices and real activity which can simply be
treated as latent common components. Moreover, for a set of identifying assumptions, a natural
by-product of the estimation is to provide impulse response functions for any variable included
in the data set. This is particularly useful in our case, since we want to understand the eﬀect of
globalization on the transmission of monetary policy to a wide range of economic variables.
The empirical model (1)—(2) and (4) provides a convenient decomposition of all data series into
components driven by the US factors Ct (i.e., the Federal funds rate and other US latent factors Ft),
non-US latent factors C∗
t , and by series-speciﬁc components unrelated to the general state of the
economies, et or e∗
t. For instance, (1) speciﬁes that indicators of measures of US economic activity
or inﬂation are driven by the Federal funds rate Rt, US latent factors Ft, and a component that
is speciﬁc to each individual series (representing e.g., measurement error or other idiosyncrasies of
each series). The dynamics of the US common components are in turn speciﬁed by (4).
Note that the factors Ct and C∗
t summarizing macroeconomic conditions in the US, respectively
i nt h er e s to ft h ew o r l d ,m a yb ea ﬀected both by their own region-speciﬁc shocks and by worldwide
or “global” shocks. In fact, since reduced-form innovations ut and u∗
t may be cross-correlated, they
could be expressed as the sum of a component that is common both the US and the rest of the
world, possibly due to “global” shocks and a component that is exclusively region speciﬁc. The
10reduced-from VAR may thus be rewritten as
C∗
t = Ψ11 (L)C∗
t−1 + Ψ12 (L)Ct−1 + Γ1gt + ε∗
t (5)
Ct = Ψ21 (L)C∗
t−1 + Ψ22 (L)Ct−1 + Γ2gt + εt (6)
where gt is a vector of “global” exogenous shocks, and ε∗
t,ε t are disturbances that are speciﬁct o
each region and uncorrelated across regions.7
2.3 Estimation
As in Stock and Watson (2002b) and BBE, we estimate our empirical model using a variant of a
two-step principal component approach which we brieﬂy outline here. We refer to these papers for
a more detailed description.
The ﬁrst step consists of extracting principal components from Xt and X∗
t to obtain consistent
estimates of the common factors under the structure laid out. In the second step, the Federal funds
rate is added to the estimated factors and the VAR in equation (4) is estimated. Note that in the
ﬁrst step, BBE do not impose the constraint that the Federal funds rate is one of the common
components. So if this interest rate is really a common component, it should be captured by the
principal components. To remove the Federal funds rate from the space covered by the principal
components, BBE perform a transformation of the principal components exploiting the diﬀerent
behavior of what they call “slow moving” and “fast moving” variables, in the second step. Our
implementation is slightly diﬀerent, however. We adopt a more direct approach which consists of
imposing the constraint that Federal funds rate is one of the factors in the ﬁrst-step estimation.
This guarantees that the estimated latent factors recover dimensions of the common dynamics not
captured by the Federal funds rate.8 To do so, we adopt the following procedure in the ﬁrst step
of the estimation. Starting from an initial estimate of Ft, denoted by F
(0)
t and obtained as the ﬁrst
K − 1 principal components of Xt, we iterate through the following steps:
7In this respect, Ct and C
∗
t have a diﬀerent interpretation than the world factors estimated by, e.g., Gregory et
al. (1997), Forni et al. (2000), Kose et al., (2003), Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005). While these authors estimate a
world factor and orthogonal region (or country)-speciﬁc factors, our estimated Ct and C
∗
t contain both ﬂuctuations
in regional and world factors.
8We thank Olivier Blanchard for pointing us in that direction.
111. Regress Xt on F
(0)
t and Rt,t oo b t a i nˆ λ
(0)
R
2. Compute ˜ X
(0)





t as the ﬁrst K − 1 principal components of ˜ X
(0)
t
4. Back to 1.
Having estimated the factors Ct and C∗
t and the factor loadings Λ, Λ∗, we can estimate the VAR
(4). As we will argue in Section 4, the matrix polynomial Ψ21 (L) will be of particular interest to us,
as it captures the eﬀects of international factors on domestic variables. For now, note that the VAR




0 is nonsingular. A suﬃcient condition for this is that the variance-covariance matrices of ε∗
t
and εt be both full-ranked in the VAR representations (5)—(6).9 In that case, C∗
t Granger causes
Ct, and the domestic factors Ct do not constitute suﬃcient statistics to uncover the dynamics of the
domestic economy. In other words, the domestic economy is not a statistical “island.” Alternatively,
if the rest of the world had no region-speciﬁcs h o c k s ,s ot h a tE (ε∗
tε∗0
t )=0 , then Ψ21 (L) would not
be identiﬁed, as international factors would bring no additional information. The estimate of the
VAR coeﬃcients Ψ21 (L) will thus rely on the presence of independent variations originating in the
rest of the world, and the Granger-causality tests that we report below will guarantee that there is
indeed suﬃcient such variation.
2.4 Data
The data we use for the estimation of the FAVAR are a balanced panel of 720 quarterly series for the
period running from 1984:1 to 2005:2. The data series are listed in the Appendix. They comprise
671 US series. Among these, there are 129 macroeconomic indicators that measure economic
activity, employment, prices, interest rates, exchange rates and other key ﬁnancial variables. In
addition, we include the 542 series of disaggregate consumption, and consumer and producer price
series used in Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov (2007). As discussed in that paper, disaggregate price
9In terms of IV intuition, to estimate Ψ12 (L), we need some independent variation in C
∗
t in order to be able to
use it as an instrument for itself in equation (6). For a formal treatment of this argument, see Hausman and Taylor
(1983).
12data provide useful information for the appropriate estimation of the monetary policy shocks, and
are found to mitigate the price puzzle obtained in conventional VARs or factor models which omit
that information. For the rest of the world, we consider a panel of 49 quarterly data series for the
15 main US trade partners. This data set includes for each country, measures of economic activity,
prices, and short and long-term interest rates (if available). All data series have been transformed
to induce stationarity, and the transformations applied are indicated in the Appendix.
2.5 Preferred speciﬁcation of the FAVAR
For the model selection, there are two important observations to keep in mind. First, the sample
size severely constrains the class of speciﬁcations we can consider, especially the number of lags
in (4), as the number of factors gets large. Second, in trying to identify the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, we are more worried about bias than eﬃciency. Available information
criteria for selecting the number of factors are thus not clearly adequate in that respect. Our
general approach for selecting our preferred speciﬁcation has thus been to try with up to twenty
domestic factors and up to 10 foreign factors.
It turns out that irrespective of the number of factors that we include, the Bayesian information
criterion selects 1 lag in (4) over the post-1984 sample. We found that including more than 10
domestic factors and 4 global factors did not change substantially the dynamic response of the
economy to monetary policy, although, obviously, the uncertainty around the estimates increases
with more factors. In fact, very similar results are obtained with as few as 6 domestic factors and
3 foreign factors, although point estimates suggest some price puzzle for some of the price series.
Our preferred speciﬁcation thus includes 10 domestic latent factors and 4 global factors, and
the transition equation (4) has 1 lag.
3 International Factors and US Economic Dynamics
Several studies have recently attempted to the determine the degree of comovement of a few macro-
economic series across countries. For instance Kose, Otrok, Whiteman (2003, 2005), Stock and
Watson (2005) study the comovement of economic activity measures and Ciccarelli and Mojon
13(2005) focus on inﬂation. In this paper, rather than restricting ourself to the comparison of a single
type of measures across regions of the world, we use our FAVAR framework to compare how the
factors summarizing the US macroeconomic dynamics relate to the rest of the world’s factors.10 If
global forces are important to describe the dynamics of the US economy, they should be captured
by the latent factor space of the FAVAR. We use the common factors extracted from our large
data set and determine the fraction of ﬂuctuations in US indicators of real activity, inﬂation and
interest rates that can be explained by US and global factors respectively. After showing to what
extent key US economic variables co-move with US and international factors, we determine whether
these relationships have changed since the mid-1980s. We then attempt to measure whether foreign
factors do “cause” (in a Granger sense) ﬂuctuations in US factors. In the next section, we report
how monetary policy shocks aﬀect a large number of variables, how the transmission mechanism
has changed over time, and to what extent the change is due to international factors.
3.1 Comovements between US and international factors
We ﬁrst start by determining to what extent US variables are correlated with US and foreign
factors. Table 1 reports the fraction of the volatility in the series listed in the ﬁrst column that is
explained by the 11 US factors Ct (i.e., 10 latent factors and the Federal funds rate), the 4 foreign
factors C∗
t , and all factors taken together. This corresponds to the R2 statistics obtained by the
regressions of these variables on the appropriate set of factors, for the entire 1984:1-2005:2 sample.
Note that since the US and international factors are allowed to be correlated, the fraction of the
variance in any given variable explained by the US factors (ﬁrst column) plus that explained by the
international factors (second column) do not correspond to the fraction of the variance explained
jointly by both sets of factors (third column). However, by comparing the numbers in the third
column to the sum of the other two columns, we may have a rough sense of how the determinants
of the variable of interest may be correlated across countries.
Looking at Table 1, several observations are worth mentioning. First, the entire US data set Xt
is on average quite strongly correlated with the common factors. On average, all factors explain 45%
10Justiniano (2004) similarly studies the comovement of multiple macroeconomic series between Canada, Australia,
and the rest of the world.
14US factors Intl. factors All factors
All US data Xt (average over all US data) 0.39 0.13 0.45
Selected US indicators
Interest rate (Federal funds) 1.00 0.65 1.00
GDP 0.30 0.18 0.37
Consumption 0.28 0.14 0.33
Investment 0.50 0.08 0.51
Exports 0.38 0.31 0.57
Imports 0.45 0.18 0.55
GDP deﬂator 0.54 0.33 0.69
Consumption deﬂator (PCE) 0.66 0.37 0.70
Investment deﬂator 0.53 0.11 0.58
Export deﬂator 0.58 0.08 0.65
Import deﬂator 0.42 0.06 0.49
Consumer price index (CPI) 0.50 0.23 0.56
Producer price index (PPI) 0.78 0.03 0.81
Industrial production 0.79 0.12 0.84
Employment (total nonfarm) 0.84 0.34 0.85
Real personal expenditures: durable goods 0.29 0.01 0.29
Real personal expenditures: nondurable goods 0.77 0.09 0.80
Price of personal expenditures: durable goods 0.58 0.43 0.68
Price of personal expenditures: nondurable goods 0.85 0.03 0.87
Price of personal expenditures: services 0.67 0.46 0.74
Long-term interest rate (10 years) 0.91 0.86 0.93
US dollar (trade-weighted nominal exchange rate) 0.74 0.27 0.78
Table 1: R2 for regressions of selected US series on various sets of factors (sample 1984:1- 2005:2)
15of the variance of US series. Most of the common ﬂuctuations in US series is however provided by
US factors, as the R2 for these factors amounts to 0.39. However, foreign factors do also appear to
be correlated with US data series, with an R2 of 0.13. Note that, at this point, we do not attempt
to determine the origin of the ﬂuctuations in the factors and the direction of causality between
US and international factors. We realize that in general US variables may be aﬀected by global
economic shocks which impact simultaneously US and international factors. Instead, we attempt
to assess to what extent international factors can explain ﬂuctuations in various US macroeconomic
variables with information that is not contained in US factors.
Looking at selected US indicators, we ﬁnd that quarterly growth rates of measures of real
economic activity such as quarterly averages of industrial production and employment display very
high correlations with the US factors (R2 statistics of 0.79 and 0.84 respectively). It may be
surprising that other activity measures such as real GDP or consumption from the national income
accounts do not appear as strongly correlated with the US factors, especially when compared with
existing evidence based on similar factor models. However, this is purely an artifact of our use of
quarterly growth for GDP components mixed with quarterly averages of monthly data. In fact,
the quarterly growth rates of the GDP components display more high-frequency variability than
those of (the quarterly averages of) employment and industrial production. Since that variability
i sn o tw e l lc a p t u r e db yU Sf a c t o r s ,al a r g ef r a c t i o no ft h e s es e r i e sv o l a t i l i t yi se x p l a i n e db yt h e
idiosyncratic terms. Were we to consider year-over-year growth rates of the variables, GDP and
consumption would display much larger contributions of US factors. The important point, however,
is that most of the ﬂuctuations in industrial production, consumption, investment or employment
indicators are determined by domestic factors. While these indicators display some correlation with
the international factors, the additional explanatory power of the latter factors is relatively low.
In fact, The R2 obtained for these variables by them regressing on all factors are not much higher
than those found by regressing only on the US factors.
Quite naturally, the picture is diﬀerent for US real exports and imports, as they appear to be
much more strongly related to international factors. Adding the international factors to the US
factors increases the fraction of the variance of exports explained from 0.38 to 0.57, and raises the
R2 of imports from 0.45 to 0.55. These global factors thus contain substantial information not
16already contained in US factors, and which is correlated with real exports and imports. Real GDP
then reﬂects the descriptions of its underlying components: while domestic factors are certainly
key, adding the international factors increases the R2 by 7 percentage points.
For US quarterly inﬂation rates, the importance of international factors varies sensibly depend-
ing on the price index used. Inﬂation of the producer price index, for instance is well described by
US factors and displays very little correlation with international factors. However, growth rates of
the US GDP deﬂator and of consumer prices, whether based on the CPI or the personal PCE deﬂa-
tor, are more correlated with international factors. The latter factors explain 37% of ﬂuctuations
in inﬂation of the PCE deﬂator. Nonetheless, the international factors don’t seem to explain much
more of consumer price inﬂation than what is explained by US domestic factors. This suggests
that the US and international factors which explain well inﬂation are strongly correlated. This is
consistent with Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005), who ﬁnd that an important component of consumer
price inﬂation is shared globally. For the GDP deﬂator, however, global factors contain information
not included in US factors. In fact, regressing this indicator on all factors raises the R2 to 0.69
compared to 0.54, when we consider only US factors. One possible explanation is that export prices
depend sensibly on international factors in a way that is not captured by US factors. The inﬂation
rate of the exports’ deﬂator does however not appear to be strongly correlated with international
factors, over our entire sample. As we will see below, though, this low correlation with international
factors is deceptive as it appears to be due to considerable instability over the sample.
The nominal exchange rate is strongly correlated with domestic factors, and the R2 with inter-
national factors is 0.27, but these global factors seem to contain surprisingly little information no
already contained in the domestic factors, and the R2 with all factors is only a little higher than
the one with only US factors.
Finally for nominal interest rates, the Federal funds rate is by assumption a US factor, but it
is also strongly correlated with international factors. Similarly, the long-term US interest rate is
very strongly correlated with US and international factors. This suggests that all of the countries
considered in our data set are aﬀected by a common factor resembling US interest rates.
173.2 Have US and international forces become more strongly correlated?
Overall, the evidence reported in Table 1 indicates that most selected key US variables are strongly
correlated with US factors and to a lesser extent with international factors. Such results have been
obtained for the sample that runs from 1984:1 to 2005:2. As mentioned in the introduction, though,
the US economy’s trade in goods and services with the rest of the world has expanded considerably,
and the ﬁnancial globalization, as measured by the sum of external assets and liabilities, has
developed at an unprecedented pace, during this period.
Such dramatic developments are likely to have aﬀected the relationship between US variables
and international factors. To date, however, the evidence about change in the synchronization of
the US economy with the rest of the world is mixed. While Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003)
ﬁnd stronger comovements of output in industrialized countries with a world factor, since the early
1980’s, than in the preceding two decades, Doyle and Faust (2005) little evidence of statistically
signiﬁcant changes, and Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), Monfort, Renne, Ruﬀer and Vitale (2003),
Heathcote and Perri (2004), Stock and Watson (2005), and Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2005) ﬁnd
reductions in the synchronization of output ﬂuctuations across countries. In addition, these studies
typically consider the period subsequent to the mid-1980s as a whole, and do not allow for changes
during that period.
Several observers have nonetheless suggested that key macroeconomic variables might have
become more dependent on the state of the economy in the rest of the world, in the last few
years. Chairman Bernanke (2007) pointed out that long-term interest rates in the US have become
sensibly more correlated with those of Germany and other industrialized economies. Some have
argued that US inﬂation may have become more strongly aﬀected by international developments,
such as the rise of China as a source of goods and services sold in the US (see, e.g., Rogoﬀ (2004),
Kamin, Marazzi, Schindler (2006), Borio and Filardo (2006), Ihrig et al. (2007)). While some US
variables may well have become more strongly correlated with international factors, our framework
allows us to assess whether a large number of macroeconomic variables in the US have become
systematically more synchronized with the factors of its major trade partners.
It is important to keep in mind that a formal empirical analysis of the recent changes due
18to the greater globalization is diﬃcult, and faces limits, as the data samples are still very short.
Nevertheless, our framework provides a rich account of these changes since 1984, which can show
to what extent the global components have revealed changes in the correlations with US variables.
Figures 1-2 document the comovement of US variables with global forces over time. They show the
fraction of the variability in US variables explained by the global factors, where the estimation is
done using a 10 year rolling window. The dates correspond to the mid-point of that window.
These ﬁgures reveal several interesting results. First, they show that international factors have
not become more strongly correlated with a broad set of US variables since 1984. The regressions
of the US common components on all international components result in R2 statistics that have not
increased on average. Second, despite a fairly constant correlation between international and US
factors, when taken as a whole, the importance of global forces on some individual US variables has
varied considerably over the sample. Part of that variation certainly reﬂects the short samples, and
may exaggerate the nature of the true changes. Nonetheless, the R2 of the regression of real GDP
growth on international factor fell from 1995 (corresponding to the period that spans 1990-2000)
to 2000 (i.e., the period that spans 1995-2005). A similar evolution can be found for consumption,
investment and imports, though the R2 found at the end of the sample are not very diﬀerent from
those obtained at the beginning of the sample. US exports, however, do seem to be more strongly
correlated with international factors after the mid-1990s, with R2 doubling from approximately
0.20 to 0.40.
In terms of prices, inﬂation in export prices is increasingly more correlated with the international
factors throughout the sample. While international factors explain only about 20% of the variance
of the export prices’ inﬂation rate around 1990, they explain close to 70% of this variance a decade
later. Import prices similarly see their correlation with international factors steadily increase over
time. This is consistent with the idea that import prices have been rising more slowly than other
consumer prices due in part to an increase in imports from low-cost emerging economies. In fact,
Kamin, Marazzi and Schindler (2006) ﬁnd that trade with China has reduced inﬂa t i o ni ni m p o r t
prices by about 1 percentage point. This ends up being reﬂected in a greater correlation the
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Figure 2: Fraction of the variance of indidual series explained by global factors, in regressions with
10-year rolling windows.
21eﬀect on the inﬂation rate of PCE prices. In addition, there is no evidence that the GDP deﬂator
has become more strongly correlated with international factors since the mid-1990s. If anything,
the R2 statistic has decreased since 1995 for the inﬂation based on the GDP deﬂator and on the
PCE deﬂator. These ﬁndings contrast sharply with the claims often made that US inﬂation may
have become increasingly determined in the rest of the world (e.g., Borio and Filardo (2006)), but
are consistent with the results of Ihrig, Kamin, Lindner and Marquez (2007).
Regarding interest rates, the Federal funds rate appears very strongly correlated with interna-
tional factors until the mid-1995s, and again by the year 2000. But in the second half of the 1990s,
the Federal funds rate appears to disconnect from the international factors for several years. For
10-year rates, the correlation with international factors seems to increase by the late 1990s, a fact
consistent with the ﬁnding by Bernanke (2007) that long-term yields in industrialized countries
have become more strongly correlated in the last few years. While we do not attempt to determine
why that correlation has increased, we note that it does not necessarily imply that US rates are
determined to a greater extent on foreign capital market. In fact, such a ﬁnding is also consistent
with the idea that US monetary policy may now have larger eﬀects on international bond markets
a tt h es a m et i m ea si ta ﬀects US ﬁnancial markets (see Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon, 2005;
Faust et al. 2006).
Finally, while the value of the US dollar seems to have been strongly correlated with international
factors for a large part of the 1990s, the recent decline in the value of the dollar appears to have
had little relation with global factors. Instead, it has been much more determined by US domestic
factors.
While these Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 have provided an interesting account of the relationship
between various US macroeconomic variables and international factors, the numbers reported are
however merely correlations, and do not imply that ﬂuctuations in US variables such as the Federal
funds rate are caused by changes in international conditions. It may well be that changes in US
conditions may be suﬃciently important to cause changes in foreign factors.
22Full sample 84:1-94:4 95:1-05:2
Factor 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Factor 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Factor 3 0.00 0.00 0.18
Factor 4 0.04 0.06 0.01
Factor 5 0.07 0.24 0.35
Factor 6 0.00 0.00 0.00
Factor 7 0.01 0.10 0.00
Factor 8 0.03 0.29 0.04
Factor 9 0.05 0.38 0.00
Factor 10 0.00 0.00 0.03
Fed. funds rate 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2: Granger-causality tests for international factors aﬀecting US factors. Table reports p-
values.
3.3 Testing the relevance of global forces for US ﬂuctuations
3.3.1 Granger causality tests
To check formally whether global forces do matter for US ﬂuctuations, we now turn to Granger
causality tests. Results are presented in Table 2. In Panel A, we test whether the lags of all
international factors, C∗
t−1, jointly have predictive power for the current values of US factors Ct
listed in the ﬁrst column, over and beyond lags of domestic factors, Ct−1. Under the null hypothesis,
foreign factors have no predictive power. The table suggests that all but one US common factors,
including the Fed funds rate, are Granger-caused by international factors at the 5% level over the
entire sample considered. The evidence is somewhat weaker when we perform the test over the
1984:1 to 1994:4 period. At this stage, this might only be reﬂecting lower power of the test over the
smaller sub-samples. Interestingly, however, combined with the evidence that we report in Section
4, it seems that global factors were not very important to explain US economic dynamics before
the late 1990’s.
This evidence implies that the feedback from the rest of the world to the US economy as
measured by Ψ21 (L), and to which we return in Section 4, are identiﬁed.
233.3.2 Has the inﬂuence of international factors on US factors increased over the last
two decades?
As the comparison of the Granger causality tests between the two subsamples crudely suggests,
the relationship of the global factors with the US economy might have changed over time. In fact,
if there is any content to the claims that the greater economic integration between the US and
the rest of the world has aﬀected the dynamics of US economic variables, the Granger causality
relationship must have changed over time.
One way to get formal evidence on this question is to test for the stability of the Granger
causality relationships. We do so using the Quandt likelihood ratio test (QLR), the asymptotic
distribution of which has been derived by Andrews (1993).11 We apply the test jointly to all global
factors.
The results are reported in Table 3. As is clear from the table, we reject stability at the 5%
level in most cases. Based on this, one important observation is that even though we have a fairly
short sample, the latter contains suﬃcient information to allow us to detect statistically signiﬁcant
changes. It remains to be investigated whether these changes have been suﬃciently important,
economically speaking, to aﬀect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Interestingly, the
Federal funds rate is the only variable for which the stability is not rejected. The data thus suggests
that while the setting of the Federal funds rate is has been aﬀected by global factors, the role of
the latter factors does not seem to have changed signiﬁcantly in our sample.
4 Implications for the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
In the last section, we determined that some of US factors have become more synchronized with
international factors over the last two decades. A natural question that arises then is to what
extent has US monetary policy become more constrained by the expansion of international trade,
and to a larger extent by the much greater globalization of ﬁnance. Do global forces mitigate the
eﬀects of US monetary policy more than they used to?
There is little doubt that, despite this globalization, the Federal Reserve has retained its capacity
11In doing so, we ignore the uncertainty in the factor estimates. When the cross section of macro indicators is












Fed. funds rate 15.94
Table 3: Stability tests for Granger-causality coeﬃcients of international factors aﬀecting future
US factors. Table reports QLR statistics and conﬁdence level (* = 10 percent; ** = 5 percent).
to align the Federal funds rate with its target rate by managing the supply of funds in the interbank
market. It is thus still reasonable to think of the Federal funds rate as being the instrument of
monetary policy. As other short-term rates such as yields on 3-month or 6 month US Treasury
securities remain very strongly correlated with actual Federal funds rate (the correlation between
the Federal funds rate and 3-months securities is above 0.99 for the period 1984-2007 and has
remained as high since 2000) they can still be viewed as primarily aﬀected by monetary policy.
Clearly, longer-term interest rates reﬂect at least in part expectations of future short-term
rates, and depend on announcements provided by central bankers. Longer-term rates have however
become more strongly correlated with international factors in recent years, as mentioned above.
Part of this change may reﬂect a greater inﬂuence of international capital markets on US long-term
rates.12 Alternatively, US factors may have more impact on international capital markets (see
Ehrmann, Fratzscher, Rigobon (2005), Faust et al. (2006)). At the same time, since monetary
policy’s eﬀect on other variables such as economic activity and inﬂation is believed to depend
partly on long-term rates, it is possible that these other variables might have become less aﬀected by
Federal funds rate movements. In addition, the increase in international trade in goods and services
may explain why US import and export prices have become more correlated with international
factors. A natural question then is what are the implications of these changes for the transmission
12See, e.g., Bernanke (2005) for an argument that increased saving in emerging economies and in oil-producing
countries has contributed to maintaining low long-term US interest rates.
25of US monetary policy?
4.1 Empirical strategy
In the context of our FAVAR framework, we can characterize the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy by computing the response of selected macroeconomic series to an identiﬁed monetary
policy shock. In the spirit of VAR analyses, we impose only the minimum number of restrictions
needed to identify the policy shock. This allows us to document some facts about the evolution
of the monetary transmission mechanism that should not be otherwise contaminated by auxiliary
assumptions.
Recall that the structural representation of our VAR transition equation takes the form (3),
where again Ct =[ F0
t,R t]
0. To identify monetary policy shocks, i.e., the surprise changes in the
Federal funds rate, we assume that the latent factors Ft and C∗
t cannot respond to innovations in Rt
in the period of the shock. The Fed funds rate, however, is allowed to respond to contemporaneous
ﬂuctuations in such factors. We thus impose the restriction that the matrix Φ0 in (3) has ones
on the main diagonal, and zeroes in the last column, except for the lower right element, which is
one. This has the implication that the monetary policy shock enters only in the last element of the
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As mentioned above, the matrix polynomials Ψ12 (L) and Ψ21 (L) determine the magnitude of
the spillovers between the US and the rest of the world’s economic variables. When Ψ21 (L)=0 , the
rest of the world has no spillovers on the US economy, meaning that ﬂuctuations in foreign economic
variables do not cause (in the sense of Granger) any ﬂuctuations in US variables. Following a US
monetary policy shock, Ψ21 (L) measures the extent to which the rest of the world contributes to
the transmission of the US monetary policy domestically.
Our strategy involves computing impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock in the
system above, and comparing them to those obtained with diﬀerent values of Ψ21 (L). The diﬀerence
26between these impulse responses provides a measure of the importance of the endogenous response
of the rest of the world in the US transmission of monetary policy. (Note that in both cases, C∗
t
is allowed to move only in response to the monetary shock.) In addition, to the extent that the
greater integration of the world economies has changed the role played by the rest of the world
i nt h et r a n s m i s s i o no fU Sm o n e t a r yp o licy, this should imply a change in Ψ21 (L).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
by documenting the changes over time in Ψ21 (L) and its implications on the impulse response
functions, it is possible to evaluate whether globalization has reduced the ability of US monetary
policy to aﬀect domestic variables.
To illustrate more directly the exercise we perform, let us consider a simpliﬁed version of this
model in which the macroeconomic factors are actually observed. To ﬁx ideas more concretely,
think of the set of relevant domestic factors Ct as being given by the domestic (or world) interest
rate Rt and domestic real activity Yt, a n dt h ef o r e i g nf a c t o r sC∗
t as corresponding foreign real
activity Y ∗
t . Let us assume that the structural model relating these variables is as follows:
Y ∗
t = ψ11Y ∗
t−1 + ψ12Yt−1 + ψ13Rt−1 + gt + ε∗
t
Yt = ψ21Y ∗
t−1 + ψ22Yt−1 + ψ23Rt−1 + gt + εt
Rt = φYt−1 + ηt
where ε∗
t and εt are region-speciﬁc output shocks and gt is a worldwide shock. The ﬁrst two
equations are reduced-form equations determining output in both regions, while the third equation
can be interpreted as an interest-rate rule, so that ηt can be viewed as a monetary policy shock.
In this context, our approach consists of comparing the impulse response functions of Yt and Rt
implied by this unrestricted system, with those obtained for diﬀerent values of ψ21. For instance,
setting ψ21 =0is equivalent to assuming that domestic variables are not aﬀected by international
developments. Comparing the two sets of impulse response functions thus provides a way to as-
sess the importance of the “feedback” or “spillover” from the rest of the world in explaining the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
In this simple context, whether or not our strategy identiﬁes the eﬀect of international factors
–i . e . t h ee ﬀect of Y ∗
t – in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy depends solely on
27whether the parameter ψ21 is identiﬁed. As mentioned in section 2, ψ21 is identiﬁed provided
that the variances of εt and ε∗
t are nonzero. If var(ε∗
t) were equal to zero, the system would be
reduced-ranked and it would not be possible to identify separately all the parameters ψij, as Y ∗
t
and Yt would be perfectly collinear. Notice that the condition that var(εt) > 0 and var(ε∗
t) > 0 is
equivalent to saying that Y ∗
t Granger causes Yt (conditional on past values of Yt).
It is important to note that our analysis does not identify directly “worldwide shocks” which
would aﬀect simultaneously domestic and international factors (such as the shock gt) in the example
above, in the absence of further restrictions. It is however not necessary to identify such global
shocks in order to quantify the eﬀects of international factors of the transmission of US monetary
policy shocks.
For illustration purposes, in this simple example, we assumed that the factors Ct and C∗
t were
perfectly observed. In our application, however, these factors are unobserved and relate to a large
set informative variables according to (1) and (2). This does not change any of the arguments just
made in the context of the simple example. Once we have estimates of Ct and C∗
t , we are back in
the world described in the previous example. The matrix polynomial Ψ21 (L) is similarly identiﬁed
when the matrix var(ε∗
t) is full rank or, alternatively, provided that C∗
t Granger causes Ct.
4.2 Implementation
In estimating the FAVAR over the sample 1984:1-2005:2, we allow for the possibility that the
international factors may aﬀect US variables diﬀerently after the year 2000. More speciﬁcally, we
expand the VAR system of our FAVAR with a dummy variable interacted with all the lags of the
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where dt takes the value 0 for the period 1984:1-1999:4 and 1 after. That means that the coeﬃcients
on the lag international factors in the equations for Ct are equal to Ψ21 (L) for 1984:1-1999:4, and
to Ψ21 (L)+Ψd
21 (L) thereafter. Given that our preferred speciﬁcation has only one lag, notice that
28allowing for this form of instability requires estimating 4 additional parameters per equation, so it
is not too costly in terms of degrees of freedom.
4.3 The eﬀects of monetary policy shocks
Figures 3 and 4 show the estimated impulse responses of a set of macroeconomic indicators to
a tightening of monetary policy, that is, an innovation in the Federal funds rate corresponding
to an unexpected increase of 25 basis points. The solid lines represent the responses computed
using the relationship between the US factors and the international factors as estimated during
the 1984:1 to 1999:4 period, along with the 70% conﬁdence intervals.13 The dashed lines, instead,
display the responses using the same FAVAR, but assuming that the US and international factors
relate as estimated after 2000. A comparison of these two sets of impulse responses allows us
to gauge the eﬀects on the monetary transmission mechanism of the changes in the relationship
between international factors and US variables. In fact, between the two sets of responses, the only
r e l a t i o n s h i p st h a ta r ea l l o w e dt oc h a n g ea r et h o s et h a td e s c r i b eh o wf o r e i g nf a c t o r se n du pa ﬀecting
US data. Note that by doing so, we maximize the length of our sample in the estimation, yet we
allow for a change in the role of international factors.
As the impulse responses based on the eﬀects of international factors estimated for the 1984:1
- 1999:4 sample reveal in Figures 3 and 4, an unexpected tightening in monetary policy results
in a gradual decline in real GDP, which tends to revert back to the original level after about 3
years. Other measures of activity, such as industrial production and employment both respond in
a similar way. Consumption also shows a similar although smaller response, while investment falls
much more. Together with the fall in domestic demand, imports fall in response to the interest
rate increase. The reduction in imports appears to be reinforced by a signiﬁcant appreciation in
the value of the US dollar, lasting about 2 years following the shock. Exports to the rest of the
world also fall signiﬁcantly following the monetary tightening. This is consistent with the fact that
the US dollar appreciates, and that output in foreign trade partners falls (not reported).
All price indices (reported in levels) show little response on impact, but also tend to fall pro-
13The conﬁdence intervals were obtained using Kilian’s (1998) bootstrap procedure.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock (cont.)
31gressively, and in a persistent way, following the monetary tightening. However, while the import
and export price deﬂators seem to respond rapidly to the shock, it takes about 3 quarters for the
GDP deﬂator and the CPI to show any movement. While the import price response may reﬂect
a slowing domestic economy, the response of export prices may be explained by a drop in foreign
demand for US goods, due both to an appreciating US dollar and to a slowing foreign economy.
4.4 Has the role of global forces on the US monetary transmission changed?
We ﬁnd little overall evidence that global forces have had a important eﬀect on the US monetary
transmission mechanism, and ﬁnd little evidence of change over the last several years. To determine
to what extent the response of macroeconomic variables to a monetary tightening has changed re-
cently, we compare the impulse responses based on the FAVAR involving the link between domestic
and international factors as estimated since 2000 (dashed lines) to those based on international
factors in the 1984-1999 period (solid lines). One interesting conclusion that emerges from this
exercise is that the variables display in both cases almost identical responses in the ﬁrst 6 to 7
quarters following the shock. After that, the responses based on the most recent international
factors reveal a slightly more rapid return to the initial level. The output and various measures of
prices, for instance, show less persistent responses to the monetary tightening. But most changes
are not statistically signiﬁcant. Only for the Federal funds rate, the long-term interest rate and
the exchange rate do we have sharper evidence that the impulse responses have changed after 3 or
4 years, when using the more recent factors. And the expectation of a higher Federal funds rate
three or more years following the shock is reﬂected in a slightly higher value of the 10-year yield.
The changes in the impulse responses just documented were obtained by allowing a diﬀerent
relationship between the US and international factors starting in the year 2000. For robustness,
we checked with alternative break dates, and found that in all cases, the changes were similar or
smaller than those reported in the ﬁgures. This suggests that if there has been a change in the
response to monetary policy shock, this phenomenon is very recent.
In brief, we found no evidence that the responses of a large number of key US variables to
monetary policy shocks have changed in the ﬁrst 6-7 quarters following the shock. However, we
found some evidence that the relationship between US and international factors has changed in
32such a way as to imply a lower persistence in the response to monetary policy shocks 8 or more
quarters after the shock.
How important are global forces for the monetary transmission? When the Federal Reserve
changes the course of monetary policy, it aﬀects both US and international factors. The response
of the latter may in turn constrain the response of the US economy. A crude way of assessing
the role of global forces in the transmission of US monetary policy it to report the responses of
US macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock, but assuming that the US factors do
not respond to global factors. Speciﬁcally, we compute the responses of the monetary shock by
setting to zero the submatrices Ψ21 and Ψd
21 referring to the international factors C∗
t . These impulse
responses that abstract from international factors are shown with dashed-dotted lines in Figures 3
and 4.
A striking conclusion is that these responses almost perfectly replicate those estimated with
the international factors in the 1984-1999 period (solid lines). It follows that the global factors in
that period don’t seem to have more than a marginal impact on the response of the US economy
to monetary shocks. Of course, we are not saying that global factors do not have an impact on the
economy, and that the Federal Reserve does not need to give any consideration to the international
economic situation. In fact, as we reported in the previous section, several key variable are strongly
correlated with international factors. Our results suggest, however, that conditional on changing
the Federal funds rate in a particular way, the response of the main US macroeconomic variables
have been little aﬀected by the response of international factors.
It is important, however, to keep in mind that in the counterfactual experiment just described
as well as in our assessment of the change over time in the eﬀect of foreign factors, we assume that
the coeﬃcients measuring the response of US variables to US factors as well as those characterizing
the dynamics of the US factors do not change. While we would in principle want to allow for
possible changes over time in the latter coeﬃcients, such exercises are unfortunately unlikely to
provide reliable results in our empirical model, given the number of extra parameters that we
w o u l dn e e dt oe s t i m a t e ,a n dg i v e no u rr e l a t i v e l ys h o r ts a m p l e .S u c ha na s s u m p t i o nm a yw e l ln o t
be satisﬁed. For instance, several authors have argued that the slope of the Phillips curve relating
US inﬂation to domestic measures of marginal costs or of activity may have changed following the
33greater economic integration of the US with the rest of the world. However, Sbordone (2007) and
Woodford (2007) argue, in simple calibrated models, that such changes are unlikely to be large.
Another possibility is that the processes determining expectations about future domestic variables
be altered by the greater openness of the domestic economy. By not letting the relationships
among domestic variables change in our empirical model with the increased globalization, we are
technically subject to the Lucas critique. One would thus need a fully-speciﬁed forward-looking
structural model to account for this issue.
5C o n c l u s i o n
It has been widely documented that international trade has continued to advance, and that the
globalization of ﬁnance has seen an extraordinary expansion since the mid 1980s. In this context,
several observers have argued that global factors may now have a greater inﬂuence than in the
past on the determination of key US macroeconomic variables, and that conditions in international
capital markets may impose more constraints on the transmission of monetary policy.
In this paper, we have attempted to quantify the changes in the relationship between interna-
tional forces and the US economy over the 1984-2005 period. To do so, we have used an empirical
model that allows us to summarize the macroeconomic conditions of the US economy and of the
rest of the world with a small number of factors. This framework allows us to quantify the ex-
tent of comovement between many key US macroeconomic variables and international factors. It
allows us to characterize empirically the transmission of monetary policy shocks to a large set of
macroeconomic indicators.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that common factors capture on
average a sizable fraction of the ﬂuctuations in US macroeconomic indicators. This provides support
to the use of our empirical model. Second, there is evidence that the role of international factors
in explaining US variables has been changing over the 1984-2005 period, but this evolution is not
systematic across series, and it is diﬃcult to see a pattern suggesting that international factors have
become generally more important. Some variables such as the long-term interest rates, as well as
import and export prices, however, do display a systematic increase of their correlation with global
34factors throughout our sample.
We don’t ﬁnd strong statistical evidence of a signiﬁcant change in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy due to global forces. Taking our point estimates literally, global forces do not
seem to have played an important role in the US monetary transmission mechanism between 1984
and 1999. This does not mean that global factors do not have an impact on the economy, as
other shocks, such as international shocks, may have an important eﬀect on US economic variables.
However, our results suggest that conditional on a monetary policy shock in the US, the response
of the main US macroeconomic variables have been little aﬀected by the response of international
factors.
In addition, since the year 2000, the initial response of the US economy following a monetary
policy shock – the ﬁrst 6 to 8 quarters – is essentially the same as the one that has been observed
in the 1984-1999 period. However, point estimates suggest that the growing importance of global
forces might have contributed to reducing some of the persistence in the responses, two or more
years after the shocks.
Overall, we conclude that if global forces have had an eﬀect on the monetary transmission
mechanism, this is a recent phenomenon. This means however that we will need more data before
we can get strong statistical conclusions on this question.
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41APPENDIX: Data Sets 
 
1 – US Macroeconomic series 
Format contains series number; series mnemonic; data span (in quarters); transformation code 
and series description as appears in the database. The transformation codes are: 1 – no 
transformation; 2 – first difference; 4 – logarithm; 5 – first difference of logarithm. Second 
differencing of logarithms was not used. Our main data set contains 17 quarterly series and 112 
monthly series with no missing observations. Quarterly averages of monthly series were taken. 
The series were taken from DRI/McGraw Hill’s  Basic Economics database, and Data Insight’s 
US Central database. 
 
  National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA) 
1  GDPR.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product Billions of Chained (2000) Dollars, SAAR 
2  CR.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Personal Consumption Expenditures Billions of Chained (2000) Dollars, SAAR 
3  IR.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Private Domestic Investment Billions of Chained (2000) Dollars, SAAR 
4  XR.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Exports Billions of Chained (2000) Dollars, SAAR 
5  MR.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Imports Billions of Chained (2000) Dollars, SAAR 
6  GR.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Government Consumption Exp. & Gross Invest., Bil. of Chained (2000) Dollars, SAAR 
7  X.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Exports of Goods and Services Billions of Dollars, SAAR 
8  XFY.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Income Receipts from the Rest of the World Billions of Dollars, SAAR 
9  M.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Imports of Goods and Services Billions of Dollars, SAAR 
10  MFY.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Income payments to the Rest of the World Billions of Dollars, SAAR 
11  MTAXATRF.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Current Taxes And Transfer Payments To Rest of the World (net) Bil. of Dollars, SAAR 
        
12  JPGDP.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Gross Domestic Product Price Index (2000=100), SA 
13  JPC.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index (2000=100), SA 
14  JPI.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Gross Private Domestic Investment Price Index (2000=100), SAAR 
15  JPX.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Exports Price Index (2000=100), SA 
16  JPM.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Imports Price Index (2000=100), SA 
17  JPG.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Government Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment Price Index (2000=100), SA 
        
  OUT ----------- Real Output and Income 
18  IPS11  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Products, Total 
19  IPS299  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Final Products 
20  IPS12  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Consumer Goods 
21  IPS13  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Durable Consumer Goods 
22  IPS18  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Nondurable Consumer Goods 
23  IPS25  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Business Equipment 
24  IPS32  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Materials 
25  IPS34  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Durable Goods Materials 
26  IPS38  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Nondurable Goods Materials 
27  IPS43  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Manufacturing (SIC) 
28  IPS67e  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Mining NAICS=21 
29  IPS68e  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Electric and Gas Utilities 
30  IPS10  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Total Index 
31  PMI  1983:4-2005:2  5  Purchasing Managers' Index (SA) 
32  PMP  1983:4-2005:2  5  NAPM Production Index (Percent) 
33  PYQ  1983:4-2005:2  5  Personal Income (Chained) (Bil 2000$, SAAR) 
34  MYXPQ  1983:4-2005:2  5  Personal Income Less Transfer Payments (Chained)  (Bil 2000$,SAAR) 
35  IPS307  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Residential Utilities 
36  IPS316  1983:4-2005:2  5  Industrial Production Index - Basic Metals 
        
  EMP ------------- Employment and Hours 
37  LHEL  1983:4-2005:2  5  Index of Help-Wanted Advertising In Newspapers (1967=100;SA) 
38  LHELX  1983:4-2005:2  4  Employment: Ratio; Help-Wanted Ads: No. Unemployed Clf 
39  LHEM  1983:4-2005:2  5  Civilian Labor Force: Employed, Total (Thous., SA) 
40  LHNAG  1983:4-2005:2  5  Civilian Labor Force: Employed, Nonagric. Industries (Thous., SA) 
41  LHUR  1983:4-2005:2  1  Unemployment Rate: All Workers, 16 Years & Over (%, SA) 
42  LHU680  1983:4-2005:2  1  Unemploy. by Duration: Average(Mean) Duration in Weeks (SA) 43  LHU5  1983:4-2005:2  1  Unemploy. by Duration: Persons Unempl.Less Than 5 Wks (Thous., SA) 
44  LHU14  1983:4-2005:2  1  Unemploy. by Duration: Persons Unempl.5 To 14 Wks (Thous., SA) 
45  LHU15  1983:4-2005:2  1  Unemploy. by Duration: Persons Unempl.15 Wks + (Thous., SA) 
46  LHU26  1983:4-2005:2  1  Unemploy. by Duration: Persons Unempl.15 To 26 Wks (Thous., SA) 
47  BLS_LPNAG  1983:4-2005:2  5  Total Nonfarm Employment (SA) - CES0000000001  
48  BLS_LP  1983:4-2005:2  5  Total Private Employment (SA) - CES0500000001  
49  BLS_LPGD  1983:4-2005:2  5  Goods-Producing Employment (SA) - CES0600000001  
50  BLS_LPMI  1983:4-2005:2  5  Natural Resources and Mining Employment (SA) - CES1000000001  
51  BLS_LPCC  1983:4-2005:2  5  Construction Employment (SA) - CES2000000001  
52  BLS_LPEM  1983:4-2005:2  5  Manufacturing Employment (SA) - CES3000000001  
53  BLS_LPED  1983:4-2005:2  5  Durable Goods Manufacturing Employment (SA) - CES3100000001  
54  BLS_LPEN  1983:4-2005:2  5  Nondurable Goods Manufacturing Employment (SA) - CES3200000001  
55  BLS_Ser.-EMP  1983:4-2005:2  5  Service-Providing Employment (SA) - CES0700000001  
56 BLS_Tra.EMP  1983:4-2005:2  5  Trade, Transportation, and Utilities Employment (SA) - CES4000000001  
57  BLS_Ret.- EMP  1983:4-2005:2  5  Retail Trade Employment (SA) - CES4200000001  
58  BLS_Whol. EMP  1983:4-2005:2  5  Wholesale Trade Employment (SA) - CES4142000001  
59  BLS_Fin.-EMP  1983:4-2005:2  5  Financial Activities Employment (SA) - CES5500000001  
60  BLS_P-Ser.EMP  1983:4-2005:2  5  Private Service-Providing Employment (SA) - CES0800000001  
61  BLS_LPGOV  1983:4-2005:2  5  Government Employment (SA) - CES9000000001  
62 BLS_LPHRM  1983:4-2005:2  1  Manufacturing  Average  Weekly Hours of Production Workers (SA) - CES3000000005  
63  BLS_LPMOSA  1983:4-2005:2  1  Manufacturing Average Weekly Overtime of Production Workers (SA) - CES3000000007  
64  PMEMP  1983:4-2005:2    NAPM Employment Index (Percent) 
        
  HSS -------------- Housing Starts and Sales 
65  HSFR  1983:4-2005:2  4  Housing Starts: Nonfarm (1947-58); Total Farm&Nonfarm(1959-); (Thous. U., SA) 
66  HSNE  1983:4-2005:2  4  Housing Starts: Northeast (Thous. U., SA) 
67  HSMW  1983:4-2005:2  4  Housing Starts: Midwest (Thous. U., SA) 
68  HSSOU  1983:4-2005:2  4  Housing Starts: South (Thous. U., SA) 
69  HSWST  1983:4-2005:2  4  Housing Starts: West (Thous. U., SA) 
70 HSBR  1983:4-2005:2  4  Housing  Authorized:  Total  New Private Housing Units (Thous., SAAR) 
71 HMOB  1983:4-2005:2  4  Mobile  Homes:  Manufacturers' Shipments (Thous. U., SAAR) 
        
  INV ---------------- Real Inventories and Inventory-Sales Ratios 
72  PMNV  1983:4-2005:2  1  NAPM Inventories Index (Percent) 
        
  ORD--------------- Orders and Unfilled Orders 
73  PMNO  1983:4-2005:2  1  NAPM New Orders Index (Percent) 
74  PMDEL  1983:4-2005:2  1  NAPM Vendor Deliveries Index (Percent) 
75  MOCMQ  1983:4-2005:2  5  New Orders (Net) - Consumer Goods & Materials, 1996 Dollars (BCI) 
76  MSONDQ  1983:4-2005:2  5  New Orders, Nondefense Capital Goods, In 1996 Dollars (BCI) 
        
  SPR --------------- Stock Prices     
77 FSPCOM  1983:4-2005:2  5  S&P's  Common  Stock Price Index: Composite (1941-43=10) 
78 FSPIN  1983:4-2005:2  5  S&P's  Common  Stock  Price Index: Industrials (1941-43=10) 
79 FSDXP  1983:4-2005:2  1  S&P's  Composite  Common  Stock: Dividend Yield (% Per Annum) 
80  FSPXE  1983:4-2005:2  1  S&P's Composite Common Stock: Price-Earnings Ratio (%, NSA) 
81  FSDJ  1983:4-2005:2    Common Stock Prices: Dow Jones Industrial Average 
        
  EXR ---------------- Exchange Rates   
82 JRXTWCNS@06.M 1983:4-2005:2  1  Trade-weighted  value of the US Dollar (Nominal, 1995=100) 
83 EXRSW  1983:4-2005:2  5  Foreign  Exchange  Rate: Switzerland (Swiss Franc Per U.S.$) 
84  EXRJAN  1983:4-2005:2  5  Foreign Exchange Rate: Japan (Yen Per U.S.$) 
85  EXRUK  1983:4-2005:2  5  Foreign Exchange Rate: United Kingdom (Cents Per Pound) 
86  EXRCAN  1983:4-2005:2  5  Foreign Exchange Rate: Canada (Canadian $ Per U.S.$) 
        
  INT ---------------- Interest Rates     
87  FYFF  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate: Federal Funds (Effective) (% Per Annum, NSA) 
88  FYGM3  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate: U.S.Treasury Bills,Sec Mkt,3-Mo.(% Per Ann, NSA) 
89  FYGM6  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate: U.S.Treasury Bills,Sec Mkt,6-Mo.(% Per Ann, NSA) 
90  FYGT1  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate: U.S.Treasury Const Maturities,1-Yr.(% Per Ann, NSA) 
91  FYGT5  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate: U.S.Treasury Const Maturities,5-Yr.(% Per Ann, NSA) 92  FYGT10  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate: U.S.Treasury Const Maturities,10-Yr.(% Per Ann, NSA) 
93  FYAAAC  1983:4-2005:2  1  Bond Yield: Moody's AAA Corporate (% Per Annum) 
94  FYBAAC  1983:4-2005:2  1  Bond Yield: Moody's BAA Corporate (% Per Annum) 
95  SFYGM3  1983:4-2005:2  1  Spread FYGM3 - FYFF 
96  SFYGM6  1983:4-2005:2  1  Spread FYGM6 - FYFF 
97  SFYGT1  1983:4-2005:2  1  Spread FYGT1 - FYFF 
98  SFYGT5  1983:4-2005:2  1  Spread FYGT5 - FYFF 
99  SFYGT10  1983:4-2005:2  1  Spread FYGT10 - FYFF 
100  SFYAAAC  1983:4-2005:2  1  Spread FYAAAC - FYFF 
101  SFYBAAC  1983:4-2005:2  1  Spread FYBAAC - FYFF 
        
  MON ---------------- Money and Credit Quantity Aggregates 
102  FM1  1983:4-2005:2  5  Money Stock: M1(Curr,Trav.Cks,Dem Dep,Other Ck'able Dep) (Bil$, SA) 
103  FM2  1983:4-2005:2  5  Money Stock:M2(M1+O'nite Rps,Euro$,G/P&B/D Mmmfs&SAv&Sm Time Dep (Bil$, SA) 
104  FM3  1983:4-2005:2  5  Money Stock: M3(M2+Lg Time Dep,Term Rp's&Inst nnly Mmmfs) (Bil$, SA) 
105  FM2DQ  1983:4-2005:2  5  Money Supply - M2 In 1996 Dollars (BCI) 
106  FMFBA  1983:4-2005:2  5  Monetary Base, Adj for Reserve Requirement Changes (Mil$, SA) 
107  FMRRA  1983:4-2005:2  5  Depository Inst Reserves: Total,Adj For Reserve Req Chgs (Mil$, SA) 
108  FMRNBA  1983:4-2005:2  5  Depository Inst Reserves: Nonborrowed,Adj Res Req Chgs (Mil$, SA) 
109  FCLBMC  1983:4-2005:2  1  Wkly Rp Lg Com'l Banks: Net Change Com'l & Indus Loans (Bil$, SAAR) 
110  CCINRV  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Credit Outstanding - Nonrevolving(G19) 
111  IMFCLNQ  1983:4-2005:2    Commercial & Industrial Loans Oustanding In 1996 Dollars  
        
  PRI --------------- Price Indexes     
112  PMCP  1983:4-2005:2  1  NAPM Commodity Prices Index (Percent) 
113  PWFSA  1983:4-2005:2  5  Producer Price Index: Finished Goods (82=100,SA) 
114  PWFCSA  1983:4-2005:2  5  Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods (82=100,SA) 
115  PWIMSA  1983:4-2005:2  5  Producer Price Index: Intermed Mat.Supplies & Components (82=100,SA) 
116  PWCMSA  1983:4-2005:2  5  Producer Price Index: Crude Materials (82=100,SA) 
117  PUNEW  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U: All Items (82-84=100,SA) 
118  PU83  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U: Apparel & Upkeep (82-84=100,SA) 
119  PU84  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U: Transportation (82-84=100,SA) 
120  PU85  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U: Medical Care (82-84=100,SA) 
121  PUC  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U: Commodities (82-84=100,SA) 
122 PUCD  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U:  Durables  (82-84=100,SA) 
123  PUXF  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U: All Items Less Food (82-84=100,SA) 
124  PUXHS  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U: All Items Less Shelter (82-84=100,SA) 
125  PUXM  1983:4-2005:2  5  CPI-U: All Items Less Medical Care (82-84=100,SA) 
126  PSCCOM  1983:4-2005:2  5  Spot Market Price Index: BLS & CRB: All Commodities (1967=100) 
        
  AHE ------------- Average Hourly Earnings 
127  BLS_LEHCC  1983:4-2005:2  5   Construction Average Hourly Earnings of Production Workers (SA) - CES2000000006  
128  BLS_LEHM  1983:4-2005:2  5   Manufacturing Average Hourly Earnings of Production Workers (SA) - CES3000000006  
        
 OTH  -------------  Miscellaneous     
129  HHSNTN  1983:4-2005:2  1  U. of Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations (Bcd-83)  
 
2 – US Personal Consumption Expenditures  
(price indexes and nominal expenditure) 
 
Format is as above: series number; series; data span (in quarters); transformation code and 
series description as appears in the database. The transformation for all data was first 
difference of logarithms, which is coded as 5. This data set contains 194 monthly price series on 
Personal Consumption Expenditures with no missing observations, and 194 monthly real 
consumption series on Personal Consumption Expenditures. Quarterly averages were taken of 
all series. We describe here the 194 price series. The 194 corresponding real consumption 
series were ordered and transformed in a similar fashion. Series were downloaded from the 
underlying tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
 
1  P1NDCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  New domestic autos 
2  P1NFCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  New foreign autos 
3  P1NETG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Net transactions in used autos 
4  P1MARG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Net purchases of used autos: Used auto margin 
5  P1REEG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Net purchases of used autos: Employee reimbursement 
6  P1TRUG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Trucks, new and net used 
7  P1REVG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Recreational vehicles 
8  P1TATG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tires and tubes 
9  P1PAAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Accessories and parts 
10  P1FNRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Furniture, including mattresses and bedsprings 
11  P1MHAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Major household appliances 
12  P1SEAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Small electric appliances 
13  P1CHNG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  China, glassware, tableware, and utensils 
14  P1RADG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Video and audio goods, including musical instruments, and computer goods 
15  P1FLRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Floor coverings 
16  P1CLFG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Clocks, lamps, and furnishings 
17  P1TEXG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Blinds, rods, and other 
18  P1WTRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Writing equipment 
19  P1HDWG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tools, hardware, and supplies 
20  P1LWNG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Outdoor equipment and supplies 
21  P1OPTG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Ophthalmic products and orthopedic appliances 
22  P1GUNG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Guns 
23  P1SPTG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sporting equipment 
24  P1CAMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Photographic equipment 
25  P1BCYG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Bicycles 
26  P1MCYG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Motorcycles 
27  P1BOAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Pleasure boats 
28  P1AIRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Pleasure aircraft 
29  P1JRYG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Jewelry and watches 
30  P1BKSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Books and maps 
31  P1GRAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Cereals 
32  P1BAKG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Bakery products 
33  P1BEEG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Beef and veal 
34  P1PORG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Pork 
35  P1MEAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other meats 
36  P1POUG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Poultry 
37  P1FISG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fish and seafood 
38  P1GGSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Eggs 
39  P1MILG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fresh milk and cream 
40  P1DAIG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Processed dairy products 
41  P1FRUG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fresh fruits 
42  P1VEGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fresh vegetables 
43  P1PFVG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Processed fruits and vegetables 
44  P1JNBG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Juices and nonalcoholic drinks 
45  P1CTMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Coffee, tea and beverage materials 
46  P1FATG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fats and oils 
47  P1SWEG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sugar and sweets 
48  P1OFDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other foods 
49  P1PEFG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Pet food 
50  P1MLTG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Beer and ale, at home 
51  P1WING3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Wine and brandy, at home 
52  P1LIQG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Distilled spirits, at home 
53  P1ESLG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Elementary and secondary school lunch 
54  P1HSLG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Higher education school lunch 
55  P1OPMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other purchased meals 
56  P1APMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Alcohol in purchased meals 
57  P1CFDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Food supplied to employees: civilians 58  P1MFDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Food supplied to employees: military 
59  P1FFDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Food produced and consumed on farms 
60  P1SHUG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Shoes 
61  P1WGCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Clothing for females 
62  P1WICG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Clothing for infants 
63  P1WSGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sewing goods for females 
64  P1WUGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Luggage for females 
65  P1MBCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Clothing for males 
66  P1MSGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sewing goods for males 
67  P1MUGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Luggage for males 
68  P1MICG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Standard clothing issued to military personnel (n.d.) 
69  P1GASG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Gasoline and other motor fuel 
70  P1LUBG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Lubricants 
71  P1OILG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fuel oil 
72  P1LPGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Liquefied petroleum gas and other fuel 
73  P1TOBG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tobacco products 
74  P1SOAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Soap 
75  P1CSMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Cosmetics and perfumes 
76  P1OPHG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other personal hygiene goods 
77  P1SDHG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Semidurable house furnishings 
78  P1CLEG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Cleaning preparations 
79  P1LIGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Lighting supplies 
80  P1PAPG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Paper products 
81  P1RXDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Prescription drugs 
82  P1NRXG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Nonprescription drugs 
83  P1MDSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Medical supplies 
84  P1GYNG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Gynecological goods 
85  P1DOLG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Toys, dolls, and games 
86  P1AMMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sport supplies, including ammunition 
87  P1FLMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Film and photo supplies 
88  P1STSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Stationery and school supplies 
89  P1GREG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Greeting cards 
90  P1ARTG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Expenditures abroad by U.S. residents: Government expenditures abroad 
91  P1ARSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Expenditures abroad by U.S. residents: Other private services 
92  P1REMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Less: Personal remittances in kind to nonresidents 
93  P1MGZG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Magazines and sheet music 
94  P1NWPG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Newspapers 
95  P1FLOG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Flowers, seeds, and potted plants 
96  P1OMHG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Owner occupied mobile homes 
97  P1OSTG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Owner occupied stationary homes 
98  P1TMHG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tenant occupied mobile homes 
99  P1TSPG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tenant occupied stationary homes 
100  P1TLDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tenant landlord durables 
101  P1FARG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Rental value of farm dwellings 
102  P1HOTG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Hotels and motels 
103  P1HFRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Clubs and fraternity housing 
104  P1HHEG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Higher education housing 
105  P1HESG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Elem and second education housing 
106  P1TGRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tenant group room and board 
107  P1TGLG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tenant group employee lodging 
108  P1ELCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Electricity 
109  P1NGSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Gas 
110  P1WSMG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Water and sewerage maintenance 
111  P1REFG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Refuse collection 
112  P1LOCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Local and cellular telephone 
113  P1INCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Intrastate toll calls 
114  P1ITCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Interstate toll calls 
115  P1DMCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Domestic service, cash 
116  P1DMIG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Domestic service, in kind 
117  P1MSEG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Moving and storage 
118  P1FIPG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Household insurance premiums 
119  P1FIBG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Less: Household insurance benefits paid 
120  P1RCLG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Rug and furniture cleaning 
121  P1EREG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Electrical repair 
122  P1FREG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Reupholstery and furniture repair 
123  P1PSTG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Postage 
124  P1MHOG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Household operation services, n.e.c. 
125  P1ARPG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Motor vehicle repair 
126  P1RLOG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Motor vehicle rental, leasing, and other 
127  P1TOLG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Bridge, tunnel, ferry, and road tolls 
128  P1AING3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Insurance premiums for user-operated transportation 
129  P1IMTG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Local transportation: Mass transit systems 
130  P1TAXG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Taxicab 
131  P1IRRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Railway 
132  P1IBUG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Bus 
133  P1IAIG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Airline 134  P1TROG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other 
135  P1PHYG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Physicians 
136  P1DENG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Dentists 
137  P1OPSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other professional services 
138  P1NPHG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Hospitals: Nonprofit 
139  P1FPHG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Hospitals: Proprietary 
140  P1GVHG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Hospitals: Government 
141  P1NRSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Nursing homes 
142  P1MING3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Health insurance: Medical care and hospitalization 
143  P1IING3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Health insurance: Income loss 
144  P1PWCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Health insurance: Workers' compensation 
145  P1MOVG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Admissions to motion picture theaters 
146  P1LEGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Admissions to theaters and opera, and entertainments of nonprofit instit. (except athletics) 
147  P1SPEG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Admissions to spectator sports 
148  P1RTVG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Radio and television repair 
149  P1CLUG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Clubs and fraternal organizations 
150  P1SIGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sightseeing 
151  P1FLYG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Private flying 
152  P1BILG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Bowling and billiards 
153  P1CASG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Casino gambling 
154  P1OPAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other commercial participant amusements 
155  P1PARG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Pari-mutuel net receipts 
156  P1REOG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other recreation 
157  P1SCLG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Shoe repair 
158  P1DRYG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Drycleaning 
159  P1LGRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Laundry and garment repair 
160  P1BEAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Beauty shops, including combination 
161  P1BARG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Barber shops 
162  P1WCRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Watch, clock, and jewelry repair 
163  P1CRPG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Miscellaneous personal services 
164  P1BROG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Brokerage charges and investment counseling 
165  P1BNKG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Bank service charges, trust services, and safe deposit box rental 
166  P1IMCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Commercial banks 
167  P1IMNG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other financial institutions 
168  P1LIFG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Expense of handling life insurance and pension plans 
169  P1GALG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Legal services 
170  P1FUNG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Funeral and burial expenses 
171  P1UNSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Labor union expenses 
172  P1ASSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Profession association expenses 
173  P1GENG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Employment agency fees 
174  P1AMOG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Money orders 
175  P1CLAG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Classified ads 
176  P1ACCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tax return preparation services 
177  P1THEG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Personal business services, n.e.c. 
178  P1PEDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Private higher education 
179  P1GEDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Public higher education 
180  P1ESCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Elementary and secondary schools 
181  P1NSCG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Nursery schools 
182  P1VEDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Commercial and vocational schools 
183  P1REDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Foundations and nonprofit research 
184  P1POLG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Political organizations 
185  P1MUSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Museums and libraries 
186  P1FOUG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Foundations to religion and welfare 
187  P1WELG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Social welfare 
188  P1RELG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Religion 
189  P1FTRG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Foreign travel by U.S. residents (110) 
190  P1EXFG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Less: Expenditures in the United States by nonresidents (112) 
191  P1TDGG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Durable goods 
192  P1TNDG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Nondurable goods 
193  P1TSSG3  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Services 
194  PPCE  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Personal Consumption Expenditures (all items) 
 
 3 – US Producer Price Indices 
 
Format is above: series number; series mnemonic (NAICS code); data span (in quarters); 
transformation code and series description as appears in the database. Quarterly averages were 
taken of all series. The transformation for all data was first difference of logarithms, which is 
coded as 5. This data set contains 154 monthly series with no missing observations. All series 
are downloaded from the website of BLS. 
 
1  311119  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other animal food manufacturing 
2  311119p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other animal food manufacturing (primary products) 
3  311211  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Flour Milling 
4  311212  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Rice milling 
5  311213  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Malt mfg 
6  311223a  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other oilseed processing (cottonseed cake and meal and other byproducts) 
7  311225p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fats and oils refining and blending (primary products) 
8  311311  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sugarcane mills 
9  311313  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Beet sugar manufacturing 
10  311412  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Frozen specialty food manufacturing 
11  311520  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Ice cream and frozen dessert mfg 
12  311920  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Coffee and tea manufacturing 
13  312140  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Distilleries 
14  32211-  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Pulp mills 
15  32213-  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Paperboard mills 
16  325620p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Toilet preparation mfg (primary products) 
17  325920  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Explosives manufacturing 
18  32731-  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Cement mfg 
19  327320  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Ready mixed concrete mfg and dist 
20  327410  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Lime 
21  327420  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Gypsum building products manufacturing 
22  327910  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Abrasive product manufacturing 
23  331210  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Iron steel pipe & tube mfg from purch steel 
24  333210  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sawmill & woodworking machinery mfg 
25  334310  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Audio & video equipment mfg 
26  335110  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Electric lamp bulb & part mfg 
27  336370  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Motor vehicle metal stamping 
28  337910  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Mattress mfg 
29  311421  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fruit and vegetable canning 
30  311423  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Dried and dehydrated food manufacturing 
31  311513  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Cheese manufacturing 
32  311611  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Animal except poultry slaughtering 
33  311612  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Meat processed from carcasses 
34  311613  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Rendering and meat byproduct processing 
35  311711  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Seafood canning 
36  311712  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fresh & frozen seafood processing 
37  311813p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Frozen cakes pies & other pastries mfg (Primary products) 
38  3118233  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Dry pasta manufacturing (macaroni  spaghetti  vermicelli  and noodles) 
39  312111p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Soft drinks manufacturing (primary products) 
40  312221  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Cigarettes 
41  3122291  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other tobacco product mfg (cigars) 
42  313111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Yarn spinning mills 
43  3133111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Broadwoven fabric finishing mills  
(finished cotton broadwoven fabrics not finished in weaving mills) 
44  315111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Sheer hosiery mills 
45  315191  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Outerwear knitting mills 
46  315223  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Men's boy's cut & sew shirt  excl work  mfg 
47  315224  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Men's boy's cut & sew trouser slack jean mfg 
48  315993  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Men's and boys' neckwear mfg 
49  316211  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Rubber and plastic footwear manufacturing 
50  316213  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Men's footwear  excl athletic mfg 
51  316214  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Women's footwear  excl athletic mfg 
52  316992  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Women's handbag & purse mfg 
53  321212  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Softwood veneer or plywood  mfg 
54  3212191  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Reconstituted wood product mfg (particleboard  produced at this location) 
55  3219181  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Other millwork  including flooring  
(wood moldings  except prefinished moldings made from purchased moldings) 
56  321991  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Manufactured homes  mobile homes  mfg 
57  3221211  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Paper  except newsprint  mills (clay coated printing and converting paper) 
58  322214  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fiber can  tube  drum & other products mfg 
59  324121  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Asphalt paving mixture & block mfg 
60  324122  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Asphalt shingle & coating materials mfg 
61  324191p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Petroleum lubricating oils and greases (primary products) 
62  325181  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Alkalies and chlorine 
63  3251881  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  All other basic inorganic chemical manufacturing (sulfuric acid  gross  new and fortified) 64  3251921  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Cyclic crude and intermediate manufacturing (cyclic  coal tar intermediates) 
65  325212  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Synthetic rubber manufacturing 
66  325222  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Manufactured noncellulosic fibers 
67  325314  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fertilizer  mixing only  manufacturing 
68  3254111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Medicinal & botanical mfg (synthetic organic medicinal chemicals  in bulk) 
69  3261131  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Unsupported plastics film sheet  excluding packaging  manufacturing  
70  326192  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Resilient floor covering manufacturing 
71  326211  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Tire manufacturing  except retreading 
72  327111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Vitreous plumbing fixtures access ftg mfg 
73  327121  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Brick and structural clay tile 
74  327122  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Ceramic wall and floor tile 
75  327124  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Clay refractories 
76  327125  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Nonclay refractory manufacturing 
77  327211  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Flat glass manufacturing 
78  327213  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Glass container manufacturing 
79  327331  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Concrete block and brick manufacturing 
80  3279931  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Mineral wool manufacturing 
81  331111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Iron and steel mills 
82  331112  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Electrometallurgical ferroalloy product mfg 
83  331221  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Rolled steel shape manufacturing 
84  331312  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Primary aluminum production 
85  331315  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Aluminum sheet  plate & foil mfg 
86  331316  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Aluminum extruded products 
87  331421  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Copper rolling  drawing & extruding 
88  3314913  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Other nonferrous metal roll draw extruding  
(titanium and titanium base alloy mill shapes excluding wire) 
89  3314923  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other nonferrous secondary smelt refine alloying (secondary lead) 
90  331511  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Iron foundries 
91  3322121  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Hand and edge tools except machine tools and handsaws (mechanics' hand service tools) 
92  332213  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Saw blade & handsaw mfg 
93  3323111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Prefabricated metal building and component manufacturing (prefabricated  
metal building systems  excluding farm service bldgs & residential buildings) 
94  332321  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Metal window and door manufacturing 
95  332431  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Metal can mfg 
96  324393  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Other metal container manufacturing  
(steel shipping barrels & drums excl beer barrels more than 12 gallon capacity) 
97  332611  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Spring  heavy gauge  mfg 
98  3326122  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Spring  light gauge  mfg (precision mechanical springs) 
99  3327224  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Bolt  nut  screw  rivet & washer mfg (externally threaded metal fasteners  except aircraft) 
100  332913  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Plumbing fixture fitting & trim mfg 
101  332991  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Ball and roller bearings 
102  332992  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Small arms ammunition mfg 
103  332996  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Fabricated pipe & pipe fitting mfg 
104  332998  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Enameled iron & metal sanitary ware mfg 
105  333111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Farm machinery & equipment mfg 
106  333131  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Mining machinery & equipment mfg 
107  333132  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Oil and gas field machinery and equipment mfg 
108  333292  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Textile machinery 
109  333293  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Printing machinery & equipment mfg 
110  3332941  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Food products machinery mfg (dairy and milk products plant machinery) 
111  3332981  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  All other industrial machinery mfg (chemical manufacturing machinery equip. and parts) 
112  3333111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Automatic vending machine mfg  
(automatic merchandising machines coin operated excluding parts) 
113  333512  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Machine tool metal cutting types mfg 
114  333513  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Machine tool metal forming types mfg 
115  3335151  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Cutting tool & machine tool accessory mfg  
(small cutting tools for machine tools and metalworking machinery) 
116  333612  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Speed changer  industrial high speed drive  & gear mfg 
117  333618  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other engine equipment mfg 
118  3339111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Pump & pumping equipment mfg (indus. pumps  except hydraulic fluid power pumps) 
119  333922  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Conveyor & conveying equipment mfg 
120  3339233  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Overhead crane  hoist & monorail system mfg  
(overhead traveling cranes and monorail systems) 
121  3339241  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Industrial truck  tractor  trailer  stacker machinery mfg  
(industrial trucks and tractors  motorized and hand powered) 
122  333992  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Welding & soldering equipment mfg (welding & soldering equipment mfg) 
123  333997  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Scale & balance  except laboratory  mfg 
124  334411  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Electron tube mfg 
125  334414  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Electronic capacitor mfg 
126  334415  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Electronic resistor mfg 
127  334417  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Electronic connector mfg 
128  3345153  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Electricity measuring testing instrument mfg  
(test equipment for testing electrical  radio & communication circuits & motors) 
129  334517p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Irradiation apparatus manufacturing (primary products) 
130  3351211  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Residential electric lighting fixture mfg  
(residential electric lighting fixtures  except portable  & parts) 131  335122  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Commercial electric lighting fixture mfg 
132  335129  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Other lighting equipment mfg 
133  335212  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Household vacuum cleaner mfg 
134  335221  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Household cooking appliance mfg 
135  335311  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Power distribution specialty transformer mfg 
136  335312  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Motor & generator mfg 
137  335314p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Relay & industrial control mfg (primary products) 
138  335911  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Storage battery mfg 
139  3359291  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Other communication and energy wire mfg  
(power wire and cable  made in plants that draw wire) 
140  335932  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Noncurrent carrying wiring device mfg 
141  335991p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Carbon & graphite product mfg (primary products) 
142  336321p  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Vehicular lighting equipment mfg (primary products) 
143  337121  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Upholstered household furniture mfg 
144  337122  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Wood household furniture  except upholstered 
145  337124  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Metal household furniture 
146  337211  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Wood office furniture mfg 
147  3372141  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Nonwood office furniture (office seating  including upholstered  nonwood) 
148  3399111  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Jewelry  except costume  mfg  
(jewelry made of solid platinum metals and solid karat gold) 
149  3399123  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Silverware & hollowware mfg ( Flatware and carving sets made wholly of metal) 
150  339931  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Doll & stuffed toy mfg 
151  339932  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Game  toy  & children's vehicle mfg 
152  339944  1983:4 - 2005:2  5  Carbon paper & inked ribbon mfg 
153  3399931  1983:4 - 2005:2  5 
Fastener  button  needle  & pin mfg  
(Buttons and parts except for precious or semiprecious metals and stones) 






4 – International Data  
 
Format is as above: contains series number; series mnemonic; data span (in quarters); 
transformation code and series description as appears in the database. The transformation 
codes are: 1 – no transformation; 2 – first difference; 4 – logarithm; 5 – first difference of 
logarithm. Our international data set contains 50 quarterly series. The series were taken mainly 
from Data Insight’s IMF (International Financial Statistics, IFS), OECD (Main Economic 
Indictators, MEI) databases. Some series were obtained from national statistics agencies 
(NatS), Global Insight (GI), and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
 
America        
 Brazil         
1  NatS  SCN4_PIBPMAS4  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, SA (average 1990 = 100) 
2  IFS  L64A@C223.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
3  IFS  L60B@C223.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Money Market Rate 
Canada        
4  GI  CANSIM  3800002  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Chained $1997, SAAR 
5  IFS  L64@C156.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
6  IFS  L60C@C156.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Treasury Bill Rate 
7 IFS  L61@C156.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1 Interest  Rate,  Govt. Bond Yield, Long Term > 10 years 
Mexico        
8  NatS    1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, MIL. 1993 Mexican Pesos 
9  IFS  L64@C273.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
10  IFS  L60C@C273.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Treasury Bill Rate 
          
Europe        
France        
11 ECB 
ESA.Q.FR.Y.0000.B1QG0
0.1000.TTTT.Q.N.A  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product 
12  IFS  L64@C132.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
13  IFS  L60C@C132.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Treasury Bill Rate, 3 months 
14 IFS  L61@C132.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1 Interest  Rate, Govt. Bond Yield, Long Term 
Germany        
15  GI  L99BV&R@C134.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, Index (2000=100) 
16 IFS  L64D@C134.M  1983:4-2005:2  5 Consumer  Price Index (combined with L64@C134.M) 
17  IFS  L60C@C134.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Treasury Bill Rate 
18 IFS  L61@C134.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1 Interest  Rate, Govt. Bond Yield, Long Term  Italy         
19 ECB 
ESA.Q.IT.Y.0000.B1QG0
0.1000.TTTT.L.N.A  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, chain linked 
20  IFS  L64@C136.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
21  IFS  L60C@C136.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Treasury Bill Rate 
22 IFS  L61@C136.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1 Interest  Rate, Govt. Bond Yield, Long Term 
 Netherland         
23 ECB 
ESA.Q.NL.Y.0000.B1QG0
0.1000.TTTT.Q.N.A  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, constant prices 
24  IFS  L64@C138.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
25  IFS  L61@C138.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Govt. Bond Yield 
 United 
Kingdom         
26 ECB 
ESA.Q.GB.Y.0000.B1QG
00.1000.TTTT.Q.N.A  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, constant prices 
27  IFS  L64@C112.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
28  IFS  L60C@C112.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Treasury Bill Rate 
29 IFS  L61@C112.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1 Interest  Rate, Govt. Bond Yield, Long Term 
         
Asia          
 China (see *)         
  30   DRI  JGDPRZNS@CH.Q    *  Real Gross Domestic Product, constant prices 
  31   IFS  L60L@C924.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Deposit Rate 
 Hong Kong         
  32   IFS  L99B&P&W@C532.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, 2000 prices 
  33   IFS  L64@C532.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
  34   DRI  RMIB3S@HK.M  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Interbank Offered Rate 
 Japan         
  35   IFS  L99BV&R@C158.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, 2000 prices 
  36   IFS  L64@C158.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
  37   MEI  JPN.IR3TCD01.ST  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, 3-months rates on CDs 
  38   IFS  L61@C158.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Govt. Bond Yield, Long Term 
 Korea         
  39   GI  GDPR@KO.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, 2000 prices 
  40   IFS  L64@C542.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
   41   IFS  L61@C542.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate Yield on National Housing Bond 
 Malaysia         
  42   IFS  L99BV&P@C548.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, 2000 prices 
   43   IFS  L60C@C548.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Treasury Bill Rate, 3 months 
 Singapore         
  44   GI  GDPR@SI.Q  1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, 2000 prices 
  45   IFS  L64@C576.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
  46   IFS  L60C@C576.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Treasury Bill Rate 
 Taiwan         
47 NatS    1983:4-2005:2  5  Real Gross Domestic Product, 2001 prices 
48  DRI  CPI@TA.M  1983:4-2005:2  5  Consumer Price Index 
49  DRI  RMCP180S@TA.Q  1983:4-2005:2  1  Interest Rate, Commercial Papers, 3-6 months, sec. mkt. 
 
* For China, real GDP numbers are based on GDP growth numbers from DRI database and estimates of the level of GDP from 
Abeysinghe and Gulasekaran (2004). Consumer Price Index: no series starting in 1984 found. 